In the face of a cyber attack launched by the Hive ransomware group, the Bank of Zambia offered a particularly creative response to their attackers’ ransom note.
On May 13th, the Bank of Zambia released a public statement informing the public that they had been targeted by cyber criminals, and that the attack had caused “partial disruptions to some of its Information Technology (IT) applications on Monday, 9th May 2022.”
According to a recent report, the Hive ransomware group purportedly encrypted the Bank of Zambia’s Network Attached Storage (NAS) device. In response, representatives of the bank refused to pay the demanded ransom and chose to mock the hackers in their initial response.
The bank then linked a picture of male genitalia and told the attackers to “suck [it]” and “learn to monetize” because locking bank networks would be ineffective.
Although security experts assumed that unrelated parties had hijacked the negotiation chat, Greg Nsofu, Technical Director at the Bank of Zambia, tacitly confirmed that this was not the case.
Once the bank confirmed that its core systems were protected from the attack, Nsofu stated that the bank’s response “pretty much told them where to get off.”
Although this was an unorthodox response to threat actors, the Bank of Zambia’s proactive steps to protect their core systems and clear refusal to pay the ransom are exemplary of how organizations should prepare and respond to ransomware attacks.
On May 19th, 2022, SentinelLabs shared their initial findings on a supply-chain attack against the Rust programming language development community, referred to as CrateDepression.
In an advisory published on May 10th, the Rust Security Response Working Group disclosed the discovery and removal of a malicious compilation unit from the crates.io community repository.
Security experts found that the threat actors attempted to impersonate a trusted Rust developer and uploaded malware to the Rust dependency community repository. The attacker(s) named their malicious crate “rustdecimal” in an attempt to typosquat and fool Rust developers looking to use the well-known rust_decimal crate.
Once the malicious crate infects a machine, the machine is scanned for the “GITLAB_CI” environment variable to identify GitLab Continuous Integration (CI) pipelines for software development. Infected CI pipelines are used to deliver a second-stage payload. The SentinelLabs team has identified these payloads as Go binaries built on the Mythic agent “Poseidon,” a red-teaming framework.
Although the responsible threat actors’ intent is currently unknown, the nature of their targets indicate that this attack could enable subsequent, larger scale supply-chain attacks relative to the development pipelines infected.
The Rust security team’s advisory recommends that organizations and projects running GitLab CI pipelines check whether they depended on the rustdecimal crate, starting from March 25th, 2022. If a dependency on that crate is detected, the CI environment may be compromised. The advisory also recommends regular dependency audits and exclusively using crates from trusted authors.
The SentinelLabs team has also assembled several Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) to assist security teams with proactive threat hunting, detection and response, which you can access here.
In the latest news surrounding international cyber attacks, an emerging Chinese threat group (dubbed “Space Pirates” by Russian threat analysts) is targeting Russian aerospace firms with phishing emails.